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CUI BONO? THE SELECTIVE REVEALING OF KNOWLEDGE AND ITS 




Current theories of how organizations harness knowledge for innovative activity cannot 
convincingly explain emergent practices whereby firms selectively reveal knowledge to their 
advantage. We conceive selective revealing as a strategic mechanism to re-shape the 
collaborative behavior of other actors in the innovation ecosystem. We propose that selective 
revealing may provide a more effective alternative to known collaboration mechanisms in 
particular under conditions of high partner uncertainty, high coordination costs, and unwilling 
potential collaborators. We specify conditions when firms are more likely to reveal knowledge 
and highlight some boundary conditions for competitor reciprocity. We elaborate upon strategies 
that allow firms to exhibit managerial agency in selective revealing, and discuss its implications 
for theories of innovation and management practice.  
 






He who receives an idea from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who 
lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me. 
 
Thomas Jefferson, letter to Isaac McPherson, 13 August 1813 
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a1_8_8s12.html 
 
The control over valuable resources is one of the most potent sources of competitive advantage 
that organizations can possess (e.g., Barney, 1991; Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978; Teece, 1986). Organizations that control resources enjoy higher rates of survival, and exert 
influence over other organizations in need of these resources. These weaker organizations, in 
turn, will strive to get access to these resources or substitute them by applying strategies such as 
partnerships, alliances, joint ventures, mergers and acquisitions, board interlocks, or political 
action (e.g., Bresser & Harl, 1986; Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Jacobs, 1974; Kale & Singh, 2009; 
Oliver, 1990; Podolny & Page, 1998). Accordingly, organization theory predicts that firms strive 
to be autonomous whenever they can, and engage in collaboration whenever they must to access 
resources and overcome environmental uncertainty (Cook, 1977; Galaskiewicz, 1985). 
In the context of innovative activity, the two most crucial resources that organizations 
will try to attain ownership of and access to are technologies and markets (e.g., Barney, 1991; 
Cook, 1977; Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Grant, 1996; Gulati & Singh, 1998). Firms in control of 
these resources should be able to generate higher rents from innovation. Consequently, they are 
also encouraged to isolate and protect these resources from other organizations through a series 
of appropriation mechanisms to ensure and sustain their favorable competitive position (e.g., 
Teece, 1986; Winter, 1987). For example, with regards to knowledge as the resource in question, 
Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) suggest that organizations should strive to maximize incoming, 
while minimizing outgoing knowledge spillovers. 
Recent empirical anomalies appear to challenge this view. For example, Yang et al. 
(2010) find that coincidental, involuntary spillovers of knowledge by a firm may actually 
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increase the possibility that it receives valuable knowledge in the future. Other studies go even 
further, indicating the value-accretive potential of strategies in which knowledge is purposefully 
and strategically disclosed to the environment. Following such “selective revealing” strategies 
(Harhoff, 1996; Harhoff et al., 2003; Henkel, 2006), firms consciously select some of their 
internally developed knowledge and make it accessible to outside actors, often for free and 
without contractual requirements. ‘Open source software’ (von Hippel & von Krogh, 2003), in 
which companies disclose the blue prints of their software products to the general public who are 
further allowed to modify and redistribute the software for free and without contact the original 
authors, represents a recent and particularly salient example. Notably, the use of selective 
revealing has already been documented in the 19th century. For example, Allen (1983) discusses 
the example of information-sharing amongst competitors in the English blast furnaces industry 
after 1850. While the application of selective revealing strategies today remains relatively rare 
(CED, 2006), the rising prominence of selective revealing in consumer goods, information 
technology, pharmaceuticals, defense, or the built environment (see also Table 2) poses a 
challenge for theories of innovation. In particular, explanations of why firms choose to enact this 
behavior, how it may be value-accretive, the boundary conditions under which they operate, and 
how selective revealing can be embedded in larger innovation strategies, are scarce. Whereas 
recent advances acknowledge the deterrence-potential of selective revealing (Clarkson & Toh, 
2010; Polidoro & Toh, 2011), there is limited research on the collaborative aspects of selective 
revealing (Fosfuri & Rønde, 2004; Henkel, 2005). 
At the heart of our argument lies a novel appreciation of selective revealing as a strategic 
mechanism to improve the firm’s technological and market conditions. In particular, firms that 
are parts of larger innovation ecosystems—defined as “the collaborative arrangements through 
which firms combine their individual offerings into a coherent, customer-facing solution” 
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(Adner, 2006: 98)—are dependent on the behavior of other actors to achieve positive returns to 
innovation (see also e.g. Adner, 2012; Pisano & Teece, 2007). We maintain that by revealing 
some of its own knowledge—either in the form of problems or solutions (von Hippel, 1988)—a 
focal firm can initiate collaborative relationships with other actors to re-shape its competitive 
environment and improve its access to technologies and markets. In contrast to prevailing 
approaches to collaboration, these selective revealing strategies may also succeed under adverse 
conditions of high partner uncertainty, high coordination costs, and when known partners are 
unwilling to collaborate—conditions under which (contractual) collaboration has previously 
been shown to be difficult to initiate (e.g., Ahuja, 2000; Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005; Emerson, 
1962; Gargiulo, 1993; Jacobs, 1974). In addition, even if revealed knowledge is merely taken in, 
but not reciprocated, by external actors producing knowledge in the firm’s innovation ecosystem 
(hereafter, externals), indirect benefits of selective revealing could already outweigh the costs for 
the focal firm. Specifically, if externals take in the revealed knowledge, because of the 
cumulative and path-dependent nature of knowledge (Nelson & Winter, 1982), future knowledge 
production by these externals and the spillovers they produce will be of higher value to the focal 
firm. In short, we argue that selective revealing holds the potential to re-shape both the active, 
deliberate as well as the passive, unknowing collaborative behavior of externals in the firm’s 
innovation ecosystem. 
Next, to understand when firms would act on the opportunity to reveal selectively, we 
analyze drivers of the value of selective revealing to the focal firm. We show how factors 
internal and external to the firm influence its decision to selectively reveal, and highlight the 
particular importance of modularity of resources, existing capabilities, and substitutive threats. 
Finally, we discuss how firms may embed selective revealing in innovation strategies. 
When considering the revealing of problems and solutions in conjunction with organizational 
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goals of extending an existing technological paradigm or creating new paradigms (Dosi, 1982; 
Garud & Rappa, 1994; Garud & Karnøe, 2001), we derive four archetypes of selective revealing: 
issue-spreading, agenda-shaping, product-enhancing, and niche-creating.  
In doing so, our analysis allows us to make several contributions to the management 
literature. First, we add to ongoing discussions on inter-organizational relations (Dollinger, 1990; 
Gulati et al., 2000; Oliver, 1990), showing how the strategic disclosure of knowledge not only 
allows the focal firm to forge new ties to external actors and form coalitions, but potentially to 
create entirely new knowledge networks. Second, we link our insights to institutional theory 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Phillips et al., 2000) and resource-dependence theory (Casciaro & 
Piskorski, 2005; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) by highlighting how selective revealing implies a 
subtle form of competitor manipulation, and thus represents an exercise of power. To explain this 
mechanism, we introduce the notion of induced isomorphism—deliberate strategic action to 
induce other actors to become more similar to the focal firm, in particular with respect to the 
production of knowledge. Finally, we contribute to conversations on the organization of 
innovative activity by discussing extensions to the concepts of absorptive capacity (Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990; Zahra & George, 2002) and open innovation (Chesbrough, 2003). 
WHY? THE BENEFITS OF SELECTIVE REVEALING 
Definition and Representation of Selective Revealing in Extant Literature 
At its core, innovation is a path-dependent, cumulative activity that involves multiple 
actors (Grant, 1996; Kogut & Zander, 1992; Nelson & Winter, 1982). Each actor privately 
invests in R&D to expand their knowledge base so as to be able to create new or improved 
products, processes, and services. At the same time, knowledge may “spill over” to competitors, 
in the sense that competitors, to the disadvantage to the focal firm, gain access to private 
knowledge. In order to be receptive to spillovers, firms build their absorptive capacity—an 
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ability to recognize the value of externally produced spillovers, assimilate them, and apply them 
inside the firm. Thus, the concept of absorptive capacity helps explain why investment in R&D, 
even when its benefits cannot be fully appropriated by the focal firm, is sensible because it 
improves the firm’s ability to learn from its environment and use this knowledge to increase 
innovative activity (e.g., Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). In line with recent empirical insights by 
Yang et al. (2010) as well as conceptual work by Agarwal and colleagues (2007, 2010), the 
above may be represented as a dynamic model in which outgoing spillovers, modified and 
enhanced by different actors along the way, may eventually return to the focal firm. This stylistic 
representation, shown in Figure 1, provides an intuitive basis to explain the logic behind why 
firms would selectively reveal knowledge.  
------------------------------------------ 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------ 
Following Henkel (2006), we define selective revealing as the voluntary, purposeful, and 
irrevocable disclosure of specifically selected resources, usually knowledge-based, that the firm 
could have otherwise kept proprietary so that it becomes available to a large share or even all of 
the general public, including the competition of the firm. Despite its contradiction with 
established literature emphasizing the protection of knowledge produced in-house, work in this 
stream has shown that selective revealing may positively affect a company’s innovation and 
business performance (Stam, 2009; West, 2003), by allowing for outsourcing-like cost cutting 
(Lakhani & von Hippel, 2003), increasing the diffusion of products leading to beneficial 
externalities (Varian & Shapiro, 1999), and changing the competitive behavior of others. 
Focusing on this latter point, both Pacheco-de-Almeida and Zemsky (2011) and Clarkson and 
Toh (2010) separately show that disclosing internal technology resources may deter rivals from 
investing in similar ones. Polidoro and Theeke (2011) find that firms publish research results to 
influence their market positioning, in particular in the face of similar efforts by rivals and under 
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substitutive threats. Finally, Farrell and Gallini (1988) show that even technology monopolists 
may gain from selectively revealing their knowledge to rivals when consumers face high 
adoption cost and are afraid of lock-in.  
Thus far, however, the literature has not fully acknowledged the use of selective 
revealing as a strategic tool and falls short of comprehensively explaining the purposeful design 
and use of strategies embodying selective revealing. For example, while Yang et al. (2010) find 
that involuntary knowledge disclosure by firms may be beneficial over time, they fall short of 
conceptualizing spillovers as purposeful, but assume that they occur by chance and suggest that 
their “results should not be interpreted as a prescription for encouraging spillovers” (p. 386). 
Relatedly, Polidoro and Toh (2011) find that firms choose not to fend off imitators when the 
threat of substitution is high, particularly in the early stages of development of a technology and 
when the underlying knowledge is new – raising the question of whether active revealing could 
allow a further leveraging of these benefits (also see Agarwal et al., 2007, 2010).  
Building on these important insights, we propose that selective revealing can best be 
understood as a strategy aiming at shaping the collaborative behavior of others in the context of 
innovative activity. Specifically, the two most crucial resources needed for innovative success 
are knowledge embodied in technology, processes, and routines underlying the firms’ products 
and services and access to the respective product markets (Grant, 1996; Gulati & Singh, 1998; 
Kogut & Zander, 1992). In turn, a firm can be expected to initiate collaborative relationships 
with other parties if it either lacks technological know-how to complete its competitive offering, 
or to increase its potential profits from its products and services by establishing or improving 
market access and position. Accordingly, a focal firm will primarily reveal knowledge 
selectively in the hope that it will lead others to modify their behavior in a way that the focal 
firm improves its access to the technologies or markets required for innovative success. Notably, 
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such a response should not be considered improbable. Externals may decide to reciprocate for a 
variety of reasons, such as the pure enjoyment of problem-solving (Lakhani & Wolf, 2005), 
status incentives (Jeppesen & Lakhani, 2010), reciprocity (Bonaccorsi & Rossi, 2006), and, of 
course, downstream financial profit (Henkel, 2006)—irrespective of whether the reciprocated 
knowledge is irrelevant (Allen, 1983) or relevant (Henkel, 2005; Spencer, 2003) to competition.  
At the same time, selective revealing dictates that the firm makes available some of its 
resources. Thus, the resources owned at a point in time determine what it can offer to entice 
others to collaborate. Following von Hippel’s distinction (1988), we suggest that the resources 
the organization should be most inclined to share are problem-related (or need-related) and 
solution-related knowledge. In the case of problem-revealing, the company purposefully 
discloses to its environment current or anticipated future technological problems for which it 
seeks others’ support. For example, firms such as HP and Intel regularly reveal knowledge about 
problems they are facing internally and future research trajectories they intend to explore in open 
calls for research (Alexy et al., 2009; MacCormack & Herman, 2004). Arguments presented 
under the labels of crowdsourcing and broadcast search advocating the inclusion of large 
numbers of externals in the solution of technical problems by disclosing these publicly or 
through intermediaries would also be encompassed by this definition (e.g., Afuah & Tucci, 2012; 
Jeppesen & Lakhani, 2010).  
In contrast, solution-revealing occurs when the focal firm voluntarily and strategically 
discloses to its environment knowledge on how to solve a certain problem, as for example 
embodied in a patent, publication, product, or product component addressing a certain need or 
providing a certain function, to encourage imitation and diffusion. For example, an upstream 
firm may be willing to share some of the results of its R&D to increase downstream demand for 
related products (e.g., Harhoff, 1996). Similarly, firms might be willing to contribute upstream 
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knowledge and IP to joint knowledge production efforts in order to attract more parties to join in 
quasi-collusive collaboration efforts to ensure the firms’ downstream competitiveness (Alexy & 
Reitzig, 2011).  For example, in 2005, IBM made publicly available 500 valuable patents to the 
open source community. Followed by several other firms including Nokia and NEC, this 
decision was motivated not by altruism, but by a desire to sustain and support collective efforts 
to create and appropriate value from open source software. 
Next, we will look at how selective revealing may be used to entice externals to display 
active collaborate behavior in situations in which other collaboration mechanisms known from 
the literature rarely apply. Subsequently, we examine how selective revealing may re-shape 
externals’ generation of knowledge and spillovers so that both are of greater value to the focal 
firm, even if externals merely use the revealed knowledge, but do not collaborate. Our intent is to 
explain (1) how selective revealing may cause externals to collaborate intentionally and directly, 
as well as (2) unknowingly and indirectly with the focal firm. 
Direct Benefits: Selective Revealing as Novel Pathway to Collaboration  
A large body of literature exists arguing that firms will try to establish relationships with 
others when they lack critical resources or are faced with environmental uncertainty (e.g., 
Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005; Hillman et al., 2009; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). In the context of 
innovation, scholars have emphasized an increasing disposition to strategically engage in 
collaborative relationships to overcome such issues (e.g., Arora et al., 2001; Chesbrough, 2003; 
Phelps et al., 2012; Powell et al., 1996). In a nutshell, this literature argues that organizations do 
not prefer to collaborate, but sometimes, they simply have to—either because technologies and 
markets crucial to innovative success are (perceived to be) controlled by others, or because of 
specialization on certain elements of the value chain as is for example common in innovation 
ecosystems (Adner, 2006; Cook, 1977; Van de Ven & Walker, 1984). Accordingly, firms 
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attempt to strategically design relationships with other actors (Bresser & Harl, 1986; Gulati et al., 
2000; Oliver, 1988, 1990) to secure access to these crucial resources and establish (relatively) 
predictable environments (Adner, 2012; Cook, 1977).  
Forms of and issues with traditional forms of collaboration. A variety of formats for 
collaboration that organizations may choose has been proposed by different literatures with 
selective revealing hitherto missing as an option (for recent reviews, see, e.g., Casciaro & 
Piskorski, 2005; Hillman et al., 2009; Parmigiani & Rivera-Santos, 2011; Phelps et al., 2012). 
Prevalent arrangements – alliances, consortia, joint ventures, or acquisitions – usually all occur 
under the shadow of a contract (so as to minimize unwanted spillovers or moral hazard). At the 
same time, it is clear that firms cannot always successfully use these mechanisms (Ahuja, 2000). 
We identify three core reasons for when this may be the case from extant literature and then 
maintain that these may be overcome by applying strategies involving selective revealing. 
First, firms will often need to go beyond currently accessible partners to get access to the 
technologies and markets they need for innovative success. However, in a context of high 
partnering uncertainty, firms may simply be unaware of who the right partner would be, or face 
prohibitively high search cost identifying them (Gulati, 1998; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Jacobs, 
1974). Notably, this problem may be bi-directional—externals that would be willing to 
collaborate may simply not be aware of the focal firm’s issue.  
Second, even if firms knew the right partners, traditional methods of cooperating 
suggested by the literature may simply be too costly to establish or coordinate (Dollinger, 1990; 
Gargiulo, 1993; Gulati & Singh, 1998; Henkel & Baldwin, 2011). While the logic of how this 
may apply to acquisitions or joint ventures is intuitive, a brief elaboration is required for 
alliances. Importantly, coordination costs associated with the formation and management of 
alliances can reasonably be assumed to increase non-linearly. Thus, if firms require multiple 
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partners to bring a technology to the market successfully – for example, if they would need to 
form a coalition to legitimize a certain technology (Dodgson et al., 2007; Garud & Rappa, 1994) 
– it is likely that the costs associated with the creation of a plethora of bilateral alliances would 
substantially decrease the value of this option. Also, the fuzzy boundaries of knowledge and the 
paradox of disclosure pose difficult challenges when assembling partnerships (Arrow, 1962).  
While consortia may present a way to mitigate some of these concerns, they have been 
shown to be much less effective when potential collaborators are competitors in product markets 
(Branstetter & Sakakibara, 2002), leading to the third issue: even under the condition that the 
firm is aware of a limited and accessible set of collaboration partners, these may be unwilling to 
collaborate. Most notably, in a situation in which an external party controls access to the 
technology and/or market desired and the focal firm has little or no bargaining power, incentives 
to collaborate for the supposed partner are limited, suggesting that a collaborative tie should be 
unlikely to form (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005). Regarding collaboration by competitors of similar 
resource endowment in consortia, Branstetter and Sakakibara (2002) summarize a debate in the 
industrial organization literature stating that efficiency gains from such endeavors may well be 
eaten up in subsequent market competition.  
These issues should be particularly salient in innovation-related contexts, where 
technological uncertainty and incomplete appropriability increase the salience of high partner 
uncertainty, high coordination costs, and potential partners’ unwillingness to collaborate. Finally, 
these three problems might also be interlinked. For example, a focal firm might already be in a 
collaborative relationship with another firm, and hope to extend this relationship to gain access 
to a resource or market to foster another innovation. However, for competitive reasons, the 
partner firm might be unwilling to comply (the third issue), forcing the focal firm into a novel 
search for alternative partners (the first issue) and subsequent contracting (the second issue). 
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We suggest that selective revealing may be an appropriate strategic move that allows 
firms to partially overcome these impediments to attain access to technologies and markets.   
Overcoming partnering uncertainty. To address the problem of unawareness of partners, 
the voluntary disclosure of knowledge is a clear signal of the intent to collaborate with externals; 
a non-trivial precursor of actual collaboration (Kogut & Zander, 1996). By selectively revealing, 
the firm is reducing the pre-existing information asymmetry about (1) whether or not it is 
looking for a collaboration partner and (2) which attributes these partners should hold, thereby 
encouraging fitting external actors to respond to the signal (see Spence, 1973). In doing so, 
selective revealing provides a solution to the basic nested problem of establishing common 
ground (“I know that you know that I know that you know…”) that needs to be solved for 
collaboration to emerge (Puranam et al., 2009). Thus, selective revealing will often represent an 
open invitation to externals to collaborate (even if the firm knows exactly who the potential 
collaborators might be). This is clear for both problem-revealing (e.g., through crowdsourcing) 
as well as solution-revealing (as shown e.g. in the earlier IBM-patents example). 
In addition, selective revealing may drastically reduce the search cost for external actors 
by allowing firms to cast a wider net in their quest for collaboration partners. This does not only 
hold for the potential number of externals that may be reached, but also with respect to their 
scope. Specifically, the open invitation given through selective revealing may be received by 
externals active outside the space in which the organization traditionally searches for 
collaboration partners which may be particularly effective in supporting the focal firms’ 
innovative efforts (Afuah & Tucci, 2012; Jeppesen & Lakhani, 2010). For example, Afuah and 
Tucci (2012) describe how problem-revealing in the form of crowdsourcing may allow firms to 
drastically expand the limits of local search. With respect to solution-revealing, Jeppesen and 
Molin (2003) articulate how software firms instigated the development of extensions to their 
15 
products by voluntarily and strategically disclosing parts of their products. We thus posit 
Proposition 1a: The higher the level of partnering uncertainty perceived by an 
organization needing to collaborate, the more likely it will consider selective revealing 
over other mechanisms to induce collaborative behavior. 
 
Overcoming coordination costs. Selective revealing can significantly reduce or even 
eliminate contracting costs as potential partners self-select to accept the open offer to collaborate, 
and mandates neither formalized nor contractual collaboration to achieve the focal firm’s goals 
(Spencer, 2003). Notably, selective revealing in itself only encompasses fixed setup costs that 
can be discounted over a potentially limitless number of collaborations. Unsuccessful contracting 
is largely eliminated since costly bilateral negotiations are replaced by the matching process of 
offer and self-selection. In fact, a substantial reduction of coordination costs is a necessary 
condition to benefit from the expansion of the scope of partner search described above. This does 
not mean that no contracting exists; however, it is usually delayed till after it is clear that the 
collaboration can be successful. For example, companies in many sectors engage in problem-
revealing by publicly disclosing them on their website (Alexy et al., 2012). In such scenarios, 
companies may often not need to negotiate at all with externals since these may submit their 
ideas for free due to motivations other than financial reimbursement (e.g., Lakhani & Wolf, 
2005; Lerner & Tirole, 2002). However, if negotiations have to take place, the revealing firm 
may, compared to other modes of collaboration, know better whether external suggestions may 
actually solve its problem (Lakhani et al., 2007) and possibly also have higher bargaining power 
due to the increased scope of search and resulting availability of alternate solutions. 
At the same time, selective revealing positively impacts the “three Cs of collaborative 
activity”—complementarity, compatibility, and commitment (Kale & Singh, 2009). Externals 
who self-select to respond to the organizational selective revealing endeavor will also signal 
information about themselves. First, externals should only self-select into collaboration if they 
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hold complementarity knowledge and use compatible processes. Because selective revealing 
creates transparency about the revealing firm’s goals regarding the collaboration (i.e., the 
expected contribution of joining parties), externals will only decide to partake in the exchange if 
it is perceived as beneficial (Emerson, 1962; Jacobs, 1974). Notably, however, even free-riding 
may generate indirect benefits to the revealing firm. Furthermore, the second party self-selecting 
into the relationship should develop even higher degrees of complementarity and compatibility to 
the focal firm by internalizing the selectively revealed knowledge.1  
Second, the specific action that represents the externals’ self-selection decision may be 
interpreted as a signal of commitment. In many cases, the focal firm will be able to observe the 
response of the external. From that, the focal firm may evaluate the external’s level of 
commitment by looking at factors such as the level of resource commitment or its reversibility. 
Third, the same method may allow the focal firm to judge the capabilities of externals. Consider 
again the earlier HP-Intel example. Following the open call, university researchers will self-
select into responding, generating two key benefits. First, the firm receives, for free, a large 
number of proposals depicting the current level of progress of research in the problem area and 
the possible range of approaches to solving the problem. Second, it can handpick, and fund or 
hire those individuals whose suggestions they deem most economically or strategically viable to 
begin the joint exploration of identifying problem solutions—that is, those with the highest levels 
of complementarity, compatibility, and commitment. 
Finally, the irrevocability of selective revealing instigates trust, as problems of moral 
hazard are minimized (Farrell & Gallini, 1988; Gulati & Sytch, 2007; Kale & Singh, 2009). In 
doing so, trust may eventually become an enabler for more intense, and higher-value information 
                                                          
1  We elaborate on these important points (“indirect benefits” and “higher complementarity and compatibility”) in 
the section titled “Indirect Benefits: Selective Revealing as Pathway to Re-Shape External Knowledge.” 
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exchange between the parties (e.g., Gulati, 1998). Notably, this would also suggest that selective 
revealing could instigate subsequent more in-depth relationships between firms (such as joint 
ventures or alliances). Consider again the above solution-revealing example of IBM disclosing 
500 patents. Not only did this lead to several other firms following suit, it also paved the way for 
IBM to come together with other firms to jointly invest into the creation of a dedicated venture 
tasked to protect these firms’ selective revealing efforts against non-practicing entities such as 
patent trolls. Summarizing, we posit:  
Proposition 1b: The higher the level of coordination costs perceived by the organization 
needing to collaborate, the more likely the organization will consider selective revealing 
over other mechanisms to induce collaborative behavior. 
 
Overcoming unwillingness to collaborate. Selective revealing offers two options to 
address the issue of powerful actors unwilling to collaborate. Generally, the most compelling 
mechanisms to reduce dependence on a powerful actor are the identification of alternate sources 
of supply and the formation of a coalition (Cook, 1977; Jacobs, 1974). Formally, how to achieve 
the first goal follows the argument of how selective revealing widens the search for partners. 
Regarding the second goal, selective revealing might not only represent an invitation to 
collaborate with the focal firm but also one to collude against another firm or even a network of 
firms. Following Polidoro and Toh (2011), firms decrease their efforts at deterring imitation 
when faced with a threat of substitution. However, the substitutive threat not only applies to the 
focal firm in question, but to all firms following the same technological trajectory (Dosi, 1982), 
that is, to all potential imitators. As these firms face similar incentive structures with regards to 
which technology trajectory they want to see emerge victorious, but have different idiosyncratic 
resource endowments for their commercialization, selective revealing by one actor may thus 
initiate reciprocal actions by others facing the same competitive issues. It is clear how this logic 
applies to the IBM-patents example, which has as its “targets” competitors such as Microsoft as 
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well as non-practicing entities. Yet, this strategy is clearly not limited to software. For example, 
as part of its “Merck Gene Index”, Merck discloses all human gene sequences into a public 
database. The goal of this initiative is clear (Pisano & Teece, 2007), namely to entice similar 
others to join Merck in preventing an upstream input to pharmaceutical products being 
monopolized by actors specializing in this space. We thus propose: 
Proposition 1c: The higher the level of unwillingness to collaborate perceived by an 
organization needing to collaborate, the more likely the organization will consider 
selective revealing over other mechanisms to induce collaborative behavior. 
 
Indirect Benefits: Selective Revealing as Pathway to Re-Shape External Knowledge 
At the same time that selective revealing may influence the intentional collaborative 
behavior of externals, we further argue that it may also have a subtle, yet important impact on 
how these externals generate knowledge that may lead to them unintentionally exhibiting 
collaborative behavior. Importantly, we maintain further that this effect should be present 
irrespective of whether or not externals reciprocate with collaborative behavior, just as long as 
they merely use the knowledge that the focal firm has released. Put differently, the cost of 
revealing might already be outweighed by indirect benefits of selective revealing, which always 
accrue if the selectively revealed knowledge is taken in. These benefits originate from changes to 
how users of the selectively revealed knowledge generate knowledge themselves and the 
voluntary and involuntary spillovers (Winter, 1987) they  produce.2 In the following section, we 
will focus our arguments on situations in which the selectively revealed knowledge is only used 
by externals who then free-ride and do not give back knowledge actively in return. If they did, 
then all effects described in the following should be present to an even stronger degree. 
                                                          
2  Notably, further benefits may exist for the revealing firm. For example, von Hippel and von Krogh (2003) 
maintain that revealing in itself brings benefits such as learning, which may outweigh its total cost. Furthermore, 
we point to the literature discussed above on the deterrence effect of revealing.  
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Why should selective revealing have an impact on the knowledge and in particular the 
spillovers that organizations taking in the revealed knowledge produce? To be able to answer this 
question, we first need to look at what constitutes the value of a externally-held knowledge, 
namely whether or not it objectively addresses a need of the firm (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; 
Lane & Lubatkin, 1998), that is, its content compatibility, and whether or not it exhibits 
structural compatibility to the firms’ existing body of knowledge, that is, an overlap in its 
categorization of knowledge (for example, according to certain scientific disciplines) and the 
language used to describe it (e.g., Dyer & Singh, 1998; Grant, 1996; Lane & Lubatkin, 1998). In 
turn, content compatibility represents the objective maximum value of externals’ knowledge (and 
of the spillovers they produce voluntarily or involuntarily), and structural compatibility predicts 
the costs of absorption. Thus, selective revealing by the focal firm will produce indirect benefits 
if it can influence others in such a way that their production of knowledge and spillovers 
generated in this process are of improved structural or content compatibility. 
Effects on content compatibility. When firms engage in problem-revealing, as argued 
above, this is likely to facilitate the development of solutions by others. Even when externals 
should be unwilling to freely share their solutions with the focal firm as voluntary spillovers, 
their involuntary spillovers will exhibit increased content compatibility, because externals will 
still be basing their production of knowledge on the needs of the focal firm. Thus, the mere use 
of the released problem-related knowledge by a sufficiently large number of externals, even if 
these do not actively reciprocate, may create externalities leading to the focal firm seeing its 
original problem sufficiently lessened or even solved entirely.  
This logic similarly applies to solution-revealing. Here, the non-reciprocated use of the 
released solution is identical to the choice of an imitation strategy by externals, or free-riding. 
However, even free riding may often be strictly beneficial to the focal firm. For example, 
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Pacheco-de-Almeida and Zemsky (2011) show how competitors switching from innovation to 
imitation strategies may convey time-related advantages to the focal firm. And in case externals 
choose to employ the revealed knowledge as an ingredient to their own innovative activity, this 
means they become more closely aligned with the technological path of the focal firm. Thus, 
future spillovers by externals taking in the revealed knowledge will have higher content 
compatibility to the focal firm. More importantly, however, these externals will also partake (to 
some degree) in the focal firm’s technological path, so that they become potential supporter to a 
focal firm’s attempt to create or displace technological standards or dominant designs, and 
legitimize new technologies or markets. This is consistent with scholars who argue that in the 
face of a substitutive threat, firms should change their evaluation of strategies encouraging 
imitation (Polidoro & Theeke, 2011; Polidoro & Toh, 2011). Thus, we propose: 
Proposition 2a: The more the focal firm seeks to influence the content compatibility of 
externals’ knowledge, the more likely it will consider engaging in selective revealing. 
 
Effects on structural compatibility. The use of selectively revealed knowledge should 
further affect the structural compatibility of future knowledge production by these externals. In 
short, when taking in the revealed knowledge, the external has to bear the cost of translation. 
Externals that want to work on a disclosed problem will need to assimilate this problem to match 
their own language and structure for knowledge. Should they intend to solve it, they will further 
have to produce an output that is structurally compatible to the problem originally revealed 
(Jeppesen & Lakhani, 2010) for which they would need to adjust their knowledge production 
processes (Grant, 1996; van den Bosch et al., 1999). In turn, this may permanently increase the 
structural compatibility of their knowledge production to the focal firm (Cohen & Levinthal, 
1990; Grant, 1996; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; van den Bosch et al., 1999).  
The argument for solution-revealing is analogous: the revealed knowledge taken in 
becomes an input to the external’s own R&D and is assimilated and adapted. However, in this 
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absorption process, it is likely that the knowledge will retain some of its original language and 
structure. Through its own absorption process, the external firm will familiarize itself with the 
original structure and language of the voluntary spillover and keep some of it as its own (e.g., 
Dyer & Singh, 1998; Lane & Lubatkin, 1998), in particular when re-using the external 
knowledge with little to no modification (Fleming, 2001; Kogut & Zander, 1992) or when 
external knowledge is generally preferred to internal knowledge (Menon & Pfeffer, 2003). 
Eventually, as shown by Yang et al. (2010), this increased structural compatibility will lead to a 
rise in the focal firm’s ability to profit from incoming spillovers. We thus posit: 
Proposition 2b: The more the focal firm seeks to influence the structural compatibility of 
externals’ knowledge, the more likely it will consider engaging in selective revealing. 
 
Inter-temporal effects. Over time, the greater a number of externals who have committed 
to a certain trajectory – including its content, structure, and language – in a given knowledge 
domain, the more beneficial it is for other actors to also convert to this trajectory and facilitate 
efficient cooperation (Grant, 1996; Kogut & Zander, 1992) necessitated by increased 
interconnectedness and mutual dependence (Gulati & Sytch, 2007). Ceteris paribus, this may 
cause the establishment of norms about the focus, structure, and language of knowledge 
production (Kogut & Zander, 1996)—as for example articulated in a dominant design (Spencer, 
2003)—potentially even if no firm is actively colluding with the selectively revealing actor.  
In short, we argue that as soon as externals choose to use the knowledge revealed by the 
focal firm (and all the more so should they decide to reciprocate by actively showing 
collaborative behavior), the focal firm may achieve benefits from externals developing higher 
levels of structural and content compatibility. Through selective revealing the focal firm may try 
to induce externals to align their technological trajectories and knowledge production processes 
so that they become more similar to that of the focal firm in the sense of higher structural and 
content compatibility. While some externals may of course see right through such strategic 
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efforts (Dollinger, 1990; Oliver, 1988, 1990)—yet may still decide to use the selectively revealed 
knowledge and possibly even reciprocate—at the same time it will cause others to unknowingly 
become more isomorphic to the firm in their knowledge generation.  
In turn, this induced isomorphic behavior and the resulting higher structural and content 
compatibility should render future collaboration with the focal firm an increasingly attractive 
option to these externals. For example, as a response to problem-revealing, firms that have a 
related technology may decide to adapt it to match the signal, thus interpreting it as information 
about a potential market. Similarly, complementors having to choose between competing 
platforms should strongly prefer an open one as it decreases uncertainty with regards to the 
outcome of contracting and future access. Finally, firms struggling with high technological 
uncertainty should be more likely to model their explorative efforts on the problems of others 
(see DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) and thus also use free intermediate solutions to then extend 
these as needed. Notably, in all of these cases, uncertainty reduction will be higher if the external 
permanently aligns itself to the revealing firm, which is likely to continue to supply further 
uncertainty-reducing knowledge. Permanent alignment may be the outcome of subsequent 
interactions, even in the absence of trust, which is only developed subsequently (Van de Ven & 
Walker, 1984). Further, each transaction increases mutual dependence on each other and thus 
increases the likelihood and value of future collaboration (Gulati & Sytch, 2007). We propose: 
Proposition 2c: The more the focal firm seeks to induce isomorphism, the more likely it 
will consider engaging in selective revealing. 
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WHEN? BOUNDARY CONDITIONS OF SELECTIVE REVEALING 
Of course, we are not trying to argue that selective revealing is universally beneficial to 
all firms in any given competitive situation. Rather, managers will need to make boundedly-
rational evaluations of whether anticipated benefits of selective revealing outweigh its potential 
costs (Henkel, 2004). In fact, even if the above-mentioned benefits render selective revealing a 
strategic alternative worth considering, this needs to be separated from the decision of whether 
the organization should actually reveal. Such a decision needs to factor in the costs that the focal 
firm needs to bear to initiate selective revealing and the risks of unwanted outcomes. Here, three 
forms of risk seem to be particularly crucial. First, by revealing, the organization may 
accidentally disclose resources beyond what it wanted to or should have released (Harhoff et al., 
2003), potentially culminating in loss of control over current and future product development 
(Chesbrough & Teece, 1996). Second, it might struggle to manage the increased complexity of 
its innovative activities that now transcend the boundary of the firm in a way that runs counter to 
the traditional emphasis on the value and protection of intellectual property generated in-house 
(Alexy et al., 2009). And finally, the organization may fail to attract externals to even use the 
revealed knowledge. These risks may, of course, be mitigated. Specifically, organizations can 
decide which resources to reveal, after taking into account their competitive position, 
capabilities, and internal processes to ensure that it may reap possible benefits of selective 
revealing. Moreover, factors external to the organization need to be taken into account.  
Internal Drivers of the Selective Revealing Decision 
Whether or not to reveal a specific resource is a question of trade-offs. While the 
organization must not reveal valueless resources (since these would most likely neither be used 
nor reciprocated by externals), it will try to abstain from disclosing resources that are of high 
competitive relevance (e.g., Polidoro & Toh, 2011). For example, firms will hesitate to disclose 
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tacit or complex knowledge as it can be kept secret easily, thus promising high returns from 
excludability and inimitability (Rivkin, 2000; Teece, 1986; Winter, 1987). However, should the 
firm decide to release such high-value resources nonetheless, this may substantially increase the 
likelihood of them being picked up by other parties, which may ultimately overcompensate for 
the initial cost of giving up exclusivity. Accordingly, such trade-offs will need to be evaluated 
for each selective revealing decision, limiting the scope for generalization.  
Looking at the organization’s resource base more broadly, modularity should increase the 
likelihood of the organization deciding to engage in selective revealing (Henkel & Baldwin, 
2011). If the firm’s resource base is modular, that means it can release some parts of it without 
having to disclose others it wants to keep proprietary. Still the released knowledge will have 
content and structural compatibility with what the firm keeps in house, so that both direct and 
indirect benefits of selective revealing are attainable. For example, an organization that has its 
knowledge based modularized along the layers of industry architecture (Jacobides, 2006) may be 
able to reveal knowledge only on one layer of the industry architecture and at the same time 
retain relatively secure revenue streams originating from activities on other layers (West, 2003). 
Furthermore, such modularity may increase the likelihood that externals exist that are interested 
in the knowledge the firm reveals, yet are not direct competitors on the product market. In turn, 
this should increase the likelihood that these externals use and reciprocate the revealed 
knowledge to engage in collaborative research (Branstetter & Sakakibara, 2002) or even 
collusion (Alexy & Reitzig, 2011; Dollinger, 1990). Accordingly, we propose: 
Proposition 3a: The degree of modularity of the organization’s resource base will 
increase its propensity to engage in selective revealing. 
 
Furthermore, we expect an organization to engage in selective revealing if it perceives 
that it is fit to benefit from it. Here, the assessment of fit includes an evaluation of all steps of the 
selective revealing process: first, are we good at disclosing knowledge—can we present it in a 
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format so that others can successfully use and possibly build on it? Specifically, the organization 
will need to de-contextualize its problems and solutions enough so that they are accessible to 
externals, yet not too much so as to ensure that subsequent related knowledge generated by 
externals will be valuable to the firm. Emergent research (Baer et al., 2012; von Krogh et al., 
2012) shows this is indeed a non-trivial process. Second, the firm will need to be ready to reap 
external knowledge. As a minimum, sufficient absorptive capacity is a prerequisite to be able to 
gain from the contributions of others to the selective revealing effort, but specific internal 
organizational practices may be required (Foss et al., 2011). On a larger scale, the organization 
may have to adjust its processes for value creation and capture—tied together to form its 
business model—should it look to profit from its selective revealing endeavor (e.g., Chesbrough, 
2006; Chesbrough & Appleyard, 2007). In addition, in particular if the organization seeks to 
induce long-term relationships with externals, it will need to ensure that its internal routines and 
culture are up for this task (e.g., Alexy et al., 2009). Organizations that have not internalized 
these respective capabilities will more likely shy away from selective revealing, as they would 
otherwise need to bear the considerable burden of establishing them. Accordingly, we posit: 
Proposition 3b: Existing firm capabilities in extracting value from external knowledge 
will increase its propensity to engage in selective revealing. 
 
External Drivers of the Selective Revealing Decision 
Two kinds of external considerations will matter in particular to firms considering 
selective revealing, (1) the firms’ competitive environment and (2) the perceived likelihood of 
externals using or reciprocating the revealed knowledge. Below, we take each in turn. 
First, competitive dynamics have the potential to affect the urgency to selectively reveal 
and thus increase firm’s tolerance to disclose valuable knowledge. In particular, selective 
revealing may be a reaction to a severe threat to a firm’s competitive position. Here, as alluded to 
before, the perceived threat of substitution (Polidoro & Toh, 2011) should strictly positively 
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affect the firm’s willingness to engage in selective revealing. Especially if knowledge is path-
dependent and learning is cumulative (Scotchmer, 1996), organizations should be willing to 
defend their paths against others, while hoping to be able to fend off imitators through lead time 
(Clarkson & Toh, 2010). Thus, in particular when multiple technological trajectories proposed 
by different organizations are competing against each other, selective revealing might become a 
compelling option since some externals may be enticed to support the focal firm (Alexy et al., 
2009), possibly tipping a standard race in the favor of the focal firm (Varian & Shapiro, 1999).  
At the extreme end of such efforts lies what is described in literature on open source 
software. Here, companies engaged in solution-revealing in order to prevent being squeezed out 
of a market entirely by a (to-be) monopolist. Specifically, firms such as Netscape—which found 
itself overwhelmed by Microsoft in the “browser wars” of the 1990s—felt that they would be 
better off competing on open products and standards rather than await certain competitive 
annihilation, and thus revealed essential parts of their product portfolio to the public. While of 
course a gamble, these companies expected higher odds of survival from taking a chance on 
whether selective revealing dynamics unfolded rather than by following traditional forms of 
product-market competition on proprietary IP (Henkel, 2004). We thus posit:  
Proposition 4: The perceived strength of a substitutive threat to the organization’s 
resource base will increase its propensity to engage in selective revealing. 
 
Beyond substitute threats, a brief look at the existing literature on collaboration shows an 
extensive list of elements of competition which should also affect selective revealing in that they 
increase or decrease the costs, urgency, or likelihood of success of selective revealing. These 
include existing collaborative networks and their structure which can be reactivated for the 
selective revealing effort (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999) and predict the firm’s reach (Schilling & 
Phelps, 2007) and its influence on other actors (Galaskiewicz et al., 2006; Powell et al., 1996). 
Further, regarding the ecosystem surrounding the firm, the number of players and their level of 
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diversity determine limit what knowledge the firm may possibly attain (e.g., Gulati & Sytch, 
2007; Mowery et al., 1996; Van de Ven & Walker, 1984). Modularity of these ecosystems at 
large (Baldwin & Clark, 2000), as expressed by layered architectures (Pisano & Teece, 2007) or 
fragmented markets (Dollinger, 1990; Jacobs, 1974) may also increase the chance of selectively 
revealed knowledge being used and reciprocated. Finally, the existence of institutions and social 
norms supporting collaboration will also positively affect the performance of selective revealing 
strategies, such as include intellectual property regimes (Teece, 1986), a culture facilitative of 
trust-building (Kale & Singh, 2009), and the general existence of an appropriate legal framework 
governing and supporting knowledge production and sharing (Fosfuri & Rønde, 2004).  Whereas 
each of these competitive factors could potentially affect selective revealing, we have restricted 
our propositions to those where there is a preponderance of evidence to build theory.  Our 
intention is not to diminish the importance of other plausible drivers, but to be parsimonious in 
our selection from a multitude of potential influences.    
HOW? ARCHETYPES OF SELECTIVE REVEALING STRATEGIES 
Finally, we address the question of how selective revealing may be embedded in 
innovation strategies. To do so, we build on our distinction of problem and solution-revealing 
which respectively focus on improving access to technologies and markets. In addition, we 
consider the innovation goals of the organization in light of the existence of technological 
paradigms (Abernathy & Utterback, 1978; Dosi, 1982; Garud & Rappa, 1994; Garud & Karnøe, 
2001), which strongly resonates with our discussion of the benefits and drivers of revealing, and 
also matters tremendously in the context of innovation ecosystems (e.g., Adner, 2012).  
Following both Garud & Rappa (1994) and Powell et al. (1996), a technological 
paradigm is best understood as a socially constructed frame of reference that informs 
organizations of what a technology can and cannot do, how it should be physically embodied, 
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and how it can be evaluated by all players in the field. Early on, a technological trajectory is 
solely sustained by the beliefs of the people exploring it and huge uncertainties exist on all 
dimensions. In addition, multiple trajectories will be competing at the same time to address the 
same market need until the emergence of a socially accepted evaluation system that selects a 
dominant design. Conversely, once a technological path is established, relative certainty exists 
over technology and markets (Abernathy & Utterback, 1978; Dosi, 1982; Garud & Rappa, 1994). 
Yet, because of the cumulative nature of knowledge, organizations will find themselves locked 
into a certain path (Garud & Rappa, 1994; Nelson & Winter, 1982). Accordingly, when the 
innovative activity of organizations aims at extending existing paths, we would expect that the 
need for collaborative behavior will mainly originate from problems of technological 
specialization or the wish to expand into different market segments. Conversely, organizations 
intending to create new paths will need to shape their technological and market environment to 
eliminate from an uncertain future as many unfavorable possible future trajectories as possible. 
Combining the two dimensions results in the matrix depicted in Table 1. In the following 
section, we explain the resulting four archetypes of selective revealing and how they allow firms 
to access technologies and markets; examples of practices embedded these strategies from 
several industries are shown in Table 2. Our examples highlight the plurality of revealing 
strategies. These strategies are often conducted through a variety of organizational structures, 
including, for example, research consortia, open source software and crowdsourcing. Rather than 
seeking to explain the specific organizational structure that enables selective revealing, we focus 
on the rationale behind the decision of the firm to reveal knowledge. Thus, while we present a 
variety of examples of selective revealing, at its core, our argument is indifferent to the specific 
mechanism or strategy chosen to selectively disclose knowledge.   
---------------------------------------------------- 




Issue-spreading, the selective revealing of technology-related knowledge to extend 
existing paths, may have two effects on the firm’s environment. Both of these build on the fact 
that issue-spreading directly embodies a need of the focal firm that others may be able to satisfy 
in a way that is mutually beneficial. First, external actors may be encouraged to submit to the 
focal firm their existing knowledge to address the specific problem. Alternatively, the revealed 
knowledge may act as a trigger for new development activity since the focal firm is signaling 
downstream demand. The crowdsourcing examples given earlier in this paper clearly illustrate 
this point. Here, the focal firm directly signals current problems it is unable to solve on its own to 
its environment in the hope of finding externals with related, yet sufficiently distinct knowledge, 
able to tackle the issue at hand.  
Second, issue-spreading can be interpreted as an invitation to collude on extending 
existing technology paths. Under the condition that R&D is either too costly for one firm to bear 
or when R&D is not a differentiation factor, the focal firm can reasonably hope for other actors 
facing similar technological problems to accept this invitation, thereby enabling or supporting 
collective strategies (Bresser & Harl, 1986; Dollinger, 1990). An example of issue-spreading can 
be seen in the GreenTouch initiative, a new consortium of leading IT companies that have come 
together try to increase the environmental performance of networks. Although often competitors, 
GreenTouch members have sought to outline the architecture, specifications, and roadmap 
required to improve network energy efficiency by a factor of 1,000 over 2010 standards by 2015. 
Issue-spreading allows these firms to indicate their commitment to this technological path, make 
interdependencies publicly visible, attract new participants and complementors, and ease the 
coordination of R&D investment decisions. 
Agenda-shaping  
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Theories of power make clear that the ability to shape discourses serves as a source of 
power (e.g., Lukes, 2005), also in collaborative relationships (e.g., Phillips et al., 2000). By 
influencing what is being talked about and how, actors may steer the social construction of 
technology paths in a direction more suitable to their needs. Extending this argument to our 
context, we suggest that problem-revealing may allow the focal firm to shape the development 
agenda for new paths it intends to create, so as to entice externals to coordinate or align around 
the production of solutions fitting to the focal firm’s intended trajectory and its gaps. Thus, a 
firm will communicate those issues they consider relevant for the creation of its most preferred 
pathway, and try to set in motion a legitimate discourse around it and connect other actors to this 
discourse to facilitate collaborative behavior (Hardy et al., 2005; Phillips et al., 2000).  
Such communication to the environment may for example occur through open research 
calls. Even more basic, simply making the focus of R&D activity known to the public through 
the company website may spur the development of related activity and their submission to the 
firm from its environment. Most famously, agenda-shaping is incorporated in the so-called 
DARPA model, which has been executed successfully by the U.S. Department of Defense for 
decades, and which has also been transferred to several Silicon Valley companies, as clearly 
shown by the examples of Intel and HP given earlier.  
Product-enhancing  
Through solution-revealing, the focal firm releases knowledge embodied for example in 
products, components, or patents, to make it available to external actors. Externals using the 
revealed knowledge may begin to provide improvements and extensions to the revealed 
knowledge itself, and by extension also to related knowledge the firm has kept in-house. In turn, 
this active encouragement of imitation should precipitate both greater convergence toward the 
focal firm’s technological trajectory as well as the generation of complements and second-
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generation innovation built on and around the revealed knowledge (e.g., Harhoff et al., 2003; 
Henkel, 2005). Second, as the fear of lock-in by a monopolistic supplier decreases through the 
release of the spillover in voluntary form (Farrell & Gallini, 1988), higher levels of use of the 
revealed knowledge, also among consumers, is more likely. For example, Google’s decision to 
make its mobile operating system Android open source has created confidence among consumers 
and mobile operators that this platform will be built upon by other firms, helping to increase its 
chances of adoption. Taken together, these two mechanisms suggest a high likelihood of network 
externalities, which may ultimately result in other firms permanently joining the focal firm’s 
knowledge trajectory (Spencer, 2003). Eventually, the effects of solution-revealing may 
culminate in inducing norms of reciprocity and create networks of knowledge production with 
the focal firm at the center (Varian & Shapiro, 1999).  
By engaging in product-enhancing, the extension of current paths through solution-
revealing, the firm has the opportunity to improve its competitive position in current markets or 
advance into new ones, even if strong competitors exist. Product-enhancing might be particularly 
appealing to firms in control of non-dominant technology platforms. For example, IBM opened 
up the core of its Eclipse software development tool to the public, including the source code of 
the software (West, 2003). Doing so increased its diffusion among end users and led to many 
commercial firms abandoning efforts at developing similar tools, instead focusing on adapting 
Eclipse to their respective needs. As many of these actors made their adaptations open to the 
public again at no cost, the functional scope of Eclipse and its compatibility with other platforms 
was extended substantially beyond IBM’s initial contribution. This led to a further boost in 
diffusion, rendering Eclipse the de-facto standard software development tool on all platforms, 
including those controlled by IBM’s fiercest rivals Microsoft and Sun in which IBM previously 
had hardly been able to establish a foothold. In turn, IBM was able to create a bustling ecosystem 
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around its platform producing upgrades and extensions to its program, and a substantially 
increased installed base to which it could sell complementary offerings.  
Niche-creating 
Niche-creating is the use of solution-revealing to shape and establish novel knowledge 
paths. Following the mechanisms laid out in the preceding section, collaboration with relevant 
others through solution-revealing and the assembly of a critical mass may allow for the creation 
of new institutional rules and resources (Phillips et al., 2000).  Put differently, the strategic 
release of solution-related knowledge may entice existing actors as well as new entrants to 
converge towards the focal firm’s technological trajectory and participate in the social 
construction process necessary to eventually legitimize this newly created path on the market.  
Specifically, niche-creating assists the firm in trying to convince other industry 
stakeholders that its preferred technology trajectory is both viable and legitimate, and should be 
preferred over alternative solutions if these exist (Garud & Rappa, 1994). By encouraging others 
to use the revealed knowledge, the firm may be able to influence its environment to converge (or 
at least shift) towards the focal firm’s preferred trajectory (Garud et al., 2002). As these 
externals’ future paths become more aligned to that of the focal firm, niche-creating will 
increasingly allow the firm to impact how other industry stakeholders think about the evolution 
of the technology, guiding them towards the firm’s preferred path. In doing so, niche-creating 
ultimately may enable the firm to shape relevant discourses and create entirely new markets that 
are closely aligned to their focal interest (Garud et al., 2002; Phillips et al., 2000). 
As a poignant example of niche-creating, Dodgson, Gann, and Salter (2007) describe the 
case of the engineering consultancy Arup, which had developed a novel technological solution to 
use elevators in case of fire emergencies. However, since established norms were strictly 
contradictory to this technological advancement, Arup needed to convince industry stakeholders 
33 
of the viability of this technology. Arup revealed its solution knowledge to its competitors and 
other externals to increase the number of actors interested in establishing this market, including 
the regulators of new building designs. Ultimately, this strategy allowed them to create and 
legitimate ‘fire engineering,’ a new niche in the built environment in which they became 
recognized as the primary authority, since everyone was in concordance with Arup’s technology 
trajectory. Finally, since Arup was strategic about which pieces of knowledge they revealed, they 
continued to command a technological lead over other industry players.  
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
We proposed a model of selective revealing as a deliberate, strategic action to improve 
conditions for innovation (Figure 2). We suggest that selective revealing is a novel mechanism to 
shape the collaborative behavior of externals. First, selective revealing may initiate active 
collaboration even under conditions of high partner uncertainty, high search costs, and when 
known partners are unwilling to collaborate. Second, it may cause passive and possibly 
unknowing collaboration by externals even when these are merely free riding on the selectively 
revealed knowledge by making future involuntary knowledge spillover more valuable to the 
focal firm and induce the external to become isomorphic. We further outline internal and 
external factors that should positively impact the firm’s propensity to engage in selective 
revealing, and point out the role of modularity, existing capabilities, and substitutive threats in 
this context. Finally, we specify four forms of selective revealing depending on whether the firm 
aims to improve its access to technologies (through problem-revealing) or markets (through 
solution-revealing) and whether it aims to extend existing paths or create new ones: issue-
spreading, agenda-shaping, product-enhancing, and niche-creating. 
------------------------------------------ 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------ 
Selective Revealing and Collaboration 
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Our work provides three insights for management theory. First, we highlight the nature of 
selective revealing as a previously undocumented, theoretically-relevant mechanism to initiate 
collaborative behavior. We extend the possibility for strategic action in reshaping environmental 
dependencies to situations in which the strategy and organization theory literature would 
consider the actor largely unable to establish access to critical resources through collaboration: 
high partner uncertainty, high coordination costs, and unusable known collaboration options 
(e.g., Bresser & Harl, 1986; Cook, 1977; Dollinger, 1990; Jacobs, 1974). We show how even 
under these circumstances, actors can positively influence environmental contingencies through 
selective revealing to create alternative source of supply, rally allies, and mitigate uncertainty.  
Our argument points to a dynamic element of network creation spurred by selective 
revealing. Current related theory is scarce on explaining the emergence of collaborative 
mechanisms such as strategic alliances beyond the argument of multiplex relations, that is, 
currently existing relationships on another dimension that will be leveraged to form the desired 
alliance (e.g., Ahuja et al., 2009; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Hallen, 2008). While existing 
relationships will still matter in our model, they are clearly not necessary for collaboration to 
emerge from selective revealing. Thus, we would argue that selective revealing represents a 
novel mechanism explaining the emergence of knowledge networks and collective strategies, in 
which, in contrast to much extant literature (e.g., Kilduff & Brass, 2010), there is a clear role 
played by managerial agency. This argument further expands on Hillman et al.’s (2009) question 
of whether organizations progress through a sequence of strategies aimed at lowering their 
dependence on their environment – we would predict that, in innovative activity selective 
revealing may often precede more resource-intensive forms of collaborative engagement. 
An important issue that remains to be addressed is what forms of networks will emerge 
from selective revealing, how these will impact the benefits and management of selective 
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revealing, and how these networks may be governed. One could imagine a star network with the 
focal firm in control of a (now semi-open) platform at the center. Such a strategic choice is 
clearly of high value to the revealing firm, but may be less attractive to potential contributors. 
Similarly, in a more fully connected network, the party originally revealing knowledge may be 
relegated to becoming a simple node. The fact that IBM has chosen this option for Eclipse (now 
governed by an independent foundation) suggests that selective revealing aimed at establishing a 
truly collective strategy against dominant competitors may require a decrease in the centrality of 
the revealing firm.3 We strongly encourage empirical research to better understand these points. 
Selective Revealing and Power 
Our model further allows us to reinvigorate the link between knowledge exchange and 
isomorphism to provide a stronger integration of theories explaining collaborative behavior with 
institutional and resource dependence. Regarding the former, the direct goal of problem and 
solution-revealing is to influence external actors’ behavior so that it is more beneficial to the 
focal firm; its indirect benefits reside in fostering the adaption of the language and structure of 
externals’ knowledge production so that it better matches the focal firm. As the relationship 
between the revealing party and the user of its knowledge is established, this link automatically 
and concomitantly forces the using party to engage in behavior similar and thus beneficial to the 
focal firm. In short, the focal firm is employing selective revealing to subtly exercise power over 
others to purposefully initiate isomorphic behavior. This induced isomorphism shares similarities 
with other forms of isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), in particular coercive 
isomorphism, which results from pressure or persuasion from environmental sources. Yet, the 
                                                          
3  UK-based semiconductor company ARM represents an interesting example for the opposite case, in which a firm 
reveals in a dominant position. ARM, which holds over 90% of its core market of smartphone microprocessors, 
has decided to open part of its platform for the development of RISC chips to create an ecosystem of specialized 
suppliers and design firms. As this ecosystem has evolved, ARM’s solutions have become the foundation for 
semiconductor manufacturers, device developers, designers, and suppliers develop chips that purposefully build 
on ARM’s central offering for the development of new generations of high-mobility, low-power-usage devices. 
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use and reciprocation of selectively revealed knowledge by external actors is not a coerced 
decision, as its provision is an open “[invitation] to join in collusion” (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983: p. 150)—an open offer to an indiscriminate number of externals which all of these are free 
to reject. Nonetheless, its acceptance will mandate at least some isomorphic behavior. Induced 
isomorphism also shares aspects of mimetic isomorphism; we have explained how some 
externals will react positively to the focal firm’s knowledge disclosures because they will reduce 
uncertainty. Finally, the ultimate goal of induced isomorphism is to create normative pressures 
by establishing dominant standards and designs. Once enough firms have converged to the focal 
firm’s trajectory, normative isomorphism may lead to the focal firm emerging as the central 
organization in a larger knowledge network or ecosystem, and stimulating bandwagon effects 
that will strongly and primarily benefit the focal firm.  
From the vantage point of resource-dependence theory, our argument implies that an 
action born out of a dependence on access to resources held by others may in fact be recast to 
become a source of control. This logic is particularly appealing when looking at the potential of 
selective revealing to act as a less expensive mechanism to generate alternate source of supply, 
and to instigate collective action in the face of power imbalance and low mutual dependence. In 
this situation, the high-power actor is likely to be able to withhold the desired resource (Casciaro 
& Piskorski, 2005) if the low-power actor cannot establish a relationship with a third party 
constraining the high-power actor (Gargiulo, 1993). If that is not the case, low-power 
organizations can try to engage in unilateral constraint absorption the effects of which, however, 
the high-power firm can often successfully nullify (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005). For example, a 
strategic alliance by the low-power actor, if perceived threatening, may simply be countered by a 
strategic alliance (with the same partner, or a rival) by the high-power actor (Gimeno, 2004). We 
would argue that selective revealing invokes different power dynamic mechanisms: because of 
37 
its wider reach and lower coordination cost, the low-power actor should find it easier to create 
alternative sources of supply and supportive coalitions than with other documented mechanisms. 
In addition, a swift and comprehensive competitive response by the high-power actor to a newly-
open competitor, especially if openness is exhibited in the core product market of the high-power 
actor, is difficult to imagine, for example because of varying levels of organizational fit to 
selective revealing strategies. We are unaware of studies on this subject, and would thus strongly 
encourage empirical work to uncover the competitive dynamics underlying these processes. 
Selective Revealing and Innovation 
We contribute to a rich innovation literature by providing a theoretical argument 
extending selective revealing beyond its known use as a deterrence mechanism (Clarkson & Toh, 
2010; Polidoro & Toh, 2011) to a facilitator of collaboration—one that is particularly helpful in, 
but not limited to, adverse conditions. Second, our discussion of the indirect benefits of selective 
revealing has made clear that it can instigate a process in which incoming spillovers become 
more valuable without the firm changing anything about its knowledge production process. In 
doing so, our arguments formalize and extend a recent contribution (Yang et al., 2010) to the 
literature on absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Todorova & Durisin, 2007; Zahra & 
George, 2002) indicating that outgoing spillovers might over time be beneficial to a firm.  
To this discussion, we contribute by conceptualizing the voluntary disclosure of 
knowledge as a conscious strategy aimed at shaping the knowledge and spillovers others 
produce. Outputs of the focal firm’s knowledge production process are purposefully disclosed so 
that they may be picked up by actors in the firm’s environment. In turn, externals’ using these 
disclosed outputs purposefully or unknowingly transform their knowledge production and 
spillovers, making them more valuable to the focal firm. Importantly, since the anticipated 
benefits of selective revealing lie in the future and depend on the activities of other actors, the 
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value of such strategies can only be appreciated by including such inter-temporal dynamics, 
which are currently not present in the absorptive capacity literature (e.g., Cohen & Levinthal, 
1990; Lane et al., 2006; Todorova & Durisin, 2007; van den Bosch et al., 1999; Volberda et al., 
2010). 
Finally, innovation scholars may benefit from our classification of selective revealing 
strategies based on what resources companies reveal and what innovation goals they seek to 
fulfill. For example, it may be used to inform ongoing debates on open innovation and the 
increasing importance of innovation conducted by non-corporate actors (Baldwin & von Hippel, 
2011; Chesbrough, 2003; Dahlander & Gann, 2010). We are hopeful that scholars active in these 
debates will enrich our conceptual framework with empirical data, so as to also clarify the 
boundary conditions of our argument. For example, much still needs to be learned about the 
relative effectiveness of problem and solution revealing, as well as the factors that lead externals 
to reciprocate in the firm’s interest. 
Future Directions 
Selective revealing is gaining recognition as an important strategic tool in hyper-
competitive industries. In terms of theory, selective revealing practices may confound 
established management theories that predict firm’s behavior and innovation outcomes. By 
perceiving selective revealing as a mechanism to re-shape the collaborative behavior of others, it 
opens new avenues to enrich strategy and organization theory, and its attendant implications for 
innovation and performance. Substantial empirical effort is needed to operationalize the drivers, 
contingencies, and outcomes of selective revealing discussed in this article in order to guide 
emergent practice as well as to provide extensions of the model presented.  
Additionally, our argument raises questions about the right degree of influence firms may 
want to exert, as too similar an environment may not present the firm with sufficiently original 
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knowledge spillovers. Thus, research could try to interrelate (changes in) the position of the 
revealing firm in the network, the network structure, and the emergent homogeneity of 
knowledge to firm performance as revealing dynamics unfold over time. We could also imagine 
selective revealing leading to value-destructive dynamics following the logic of patent races. In a 
similar vein, one might imagine firms using selective revealing as a bluff. Specifically, a firm 
may disclose knowledge they consider a dead end, hoping that externals commit substantial 
resources to find that out for themselves and giving the focal firm the opportunity to achieve lead 
time in an area it considers crucial. Further systematic evidence is likely to enrich our knowledge 
of the false signals and competitive gaming even within selective revealing strategies.   
When knowledge is to be revealed, an essential issue lies in how to structure and present 
the selective revealed knowledge so as to maximize direct and indirect benefits (Baer et al., 
2012; von Krogh et al., 2012). This would open an avenue to connect our reasoning to the 
problem-based view of the firm (Nickerson & Zenger, 2004). Also, there is a question of how 
selective revealing relates to the concept of disruptive innovation and the issue of overcoming 
inertial forces favoring the extension of known technological trajectories (e.g., Christensen, 
1997). Selective revealing may present an opportunity to incumbents to disrupt themselves—
however, at the same time it may enable competitors to initiate and coordinate the development 
and diffusion of disruptive innovations.4 Finally, from a theoretical perspective, our argument 
largely focused on knowledge as selectively revealed resource. However, we see promise in 
extending it to other non-rivalrous resources, and in identifying conditions under which it could 
also apply when the revealed resource is rivalrous. 
Managerial Implications 
                                                          
4  We are indebted to an anonymous reviewer for bringing this possible extension of our work to our attention, as 
well as suggesting the intriguing idea of selective revealing as a bluff. 
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From the perspective of managers charged with creating and implementing corporate and 
innovation strategy, our argument is a clear call toward making selective revealing a standard 
tool in the competitive toolbox. Specifically, we point out why, when, and how managers can 
reasonably hope to benefit from selective revealing to solve problems, shape technologies, 
improve market positioning, or even build create new niches. In addition, we provide insight to 
firms in whose environment selective revealing takes place, and encourage firms to study 
potential idiosyncratic advantages from reciprocating even if they know that such action might 
also be beneficial to somebody else. Finally, our argument can act as a note of caution to 
managers in currently dominant strategic positions, for whom the threat of being attacked 
through selectively revealing may loom large. In turn, even these firms may find that under 
certain conditions, they may stand to benefit from selectively opening their resources to others to 
preempt being outmaneuvered by a coalition assembled via a selective revealing strategy. 
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FIGURE 1 
Innovation as an Iterative, Multi-agent System Involving Spillovers 
 
Note:  The small circle represents the spillover that is being “passed on.” The shading of both the large 




A Process Model of the Selective Revealing  
 
 
Note:  Elements shaded in gray represent relationships that are discussed in the paper but for which we 
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  Mode of Revealing 




















Selective Revealing Strategies: Examples of Successful Implementation from the Academic Literature 
Strategy Definition Studies Study contexts 
Issue-
spreading 
Encourage others to participate in shared problem solving 
and/or to make complementary investments 
Füller (2010); Jeppesen & 
Lakhani (2010)  
Firms on InnoCentive*, 
consumer goods, IT 
Agenda-
shaping 
Highlight firm’s future demands so others can privately invest 
in and/or actively assist focal firm in developing solutions and 
complimentary offerings 
MacCormack & Herman 
(2004); Alexy et al. (2009)  
Defense industry, IT, 
pharma, consumer goods 
Product-
enhancing 
Facilitate wide use of revealed knowledge to increase value of 
complementary assets and likelihood of reciprocal behavior 
Allen (1983); von Hippel 
(1988); West (2003) 
User innovation in all 
sectors, engineering, IT 
Niche-
creating 
Build critical mass supporting firm’s technology trajectory to 
attain buy-in from crucial actors in ecosystem 
(Garud et al., 2002), 
Dodgson et al. (2007) 
Built environment, IT 
 
*  As Lakhani et al. (2007) explain, the problems posted on InnoCentive usually mainly stem from the life sciences, chemistry, or the applied 
sciences. Accordingly, the firms posting them would all be included in Scotchmer’s (1996) definition of cumulative industries. 
